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Abstract
Hierarchical access control is an important and traditional problem in informa-
tion security. In 2001, Wu et.al. proposed an elegant solution for hierarchical
access control by the secure-filter. Jeng and Wang presented an improvement of
Wu et. al.’s method by the ECC cryptosystem. However, secure-filter method
is insecure in dynaminc access control. Lie, Hsu and Tripathy, Paul pointed
out some secure leaks on the secure-filter and presented some improvements
to eliminate these secure flaws. In this paper, we revise the secure-filter in
Jeng-Wang method and propose another secure solutions in hierarchical access
control problem. CA is a super security class (user) in our proposed method
and the secure-filter of ui in our solutions is a polynomial of degree ni + 1 in
Z
∗
p, fi(x) = (x− hi)(x− a1) · · · (x− ani) +Lli(Ki). Although the degree of our
secure-filter is larger than others solutions, our solution is secure and efficient
in dynamics access control.
Keywords: Hierarchial access control, Key management, Secure-filter,
Dynamic access control, ECC.
1. Introduction
The access control problems in a computer (communication) system are
structured as a user hierarchy. Under such a hierarchy, the users and their
own data are organized into a number of disjoint set of security classes and
each user is assigned to a security class called the user’s security clearance. Let
S = {u1, u2, · · · , un} be a set of n-disjoint security classes. Assume that “≤” is
a partial ordering on S. In (S,≤), uj ≤ ui means that the user ui has a security
clearance higher than or equal to the user uj in the security class (S,≤). In
other words, the user ui can read the information items which belong to the
user uj, but uj cannot read the data which belong to ui in this partial ordering
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system. uj is called the successor of ui and ui is called the predecessor of uj if
uj ≤ ui.
The first solution of hierarchical access control problem is developed by Akl
and Taylor[1] in 1983. They assigned a public integer ti to each security user
ui with the property that ti|tj iff uj ≤ ui. The central authority (CA) in their
scheme assigned a security number K0 and the cryptographic key for ui is com-
puted by Ki = K
ti
0 (mod p) where p is a large prime number. The predecessor
ui of uj can obtain the cryptographical key Kj by
Kj = (K
ti
0 )
tj
ti = (Ki)
tj
ti (mod p). (1)
Obviously, the user ui can obtain Kj for some user uj if and only if ui is a
predecessor of uj , that is uj ≤ ui. However, the size of the public information
ti will grow linearly with the number of security classes in Alk and Taylor’s
scheme. Hence, MacKinnon et.al.[10] and Harn et.al.[7] presented different key
assignment schemes to improve Akl and Taylor’s method, respectively. However,
all secret keys must be re-generated when a security class is added into or deleted
from the user hierarchy in these methods. The dynamic access control problems
cannot be efficiently solved.
Since then, several solutions[2, 3, 5] have been proposed to archive the target
of the dynamic access control problem in hierarchy by keeping the size of public
information as small as possible. However, these approaches are inefficient if the
user with a high security of his successor without an immediate one. In 1995,
Tsai and Chang[12] presented an elegant key management scheme based on the
Rabin public cryptosystem and Chinese remainder theorem. Their method is
efficient in the key-generation and key-derivation processes, but a group of secret
data is required to be held by each security class.
Recently, Wu et.al.[14] proposed a novel key management scheme by the
secure-filter function to solve the dynamic access control problems. The secure-
filter function that Wu et.al. used is defined as
fi(x) =
∏
t
(x− gsti ) +Ki (2)
for all ui < ut where st is the secret number of ui and gi is a public random
integer chosen by ui (see [14] for further details). In 2006, Jeng and Wang[6]
presented an efficient solution of access control problem in hierarchy by com-
bining the secure-filter and ECC cryptosystem. The secure-filter in Jeng-Wang
method is given by
fi(x) =
∏
t
(x − A˜(niPt)) +Ki (3)
for all ui < ut where A˜ is a function from an elliptic group to Z
∗
p (see [6] for the
details ). The major advantages of Wu et.al’s and Jeng-Wang schemes were to
solve the dynamic key management efficiently. Both of them are not necessary
to re-generate keys for all the security classes in the hierarchy when the security
class is added into or deleted from the user hierarchy.
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In 2009-2011, Lin and Hsu[8, 9] pointed out a security leak of the Jeng-Wang
method. To eliminate this security flaw, Lin and Hsu revised the secure-filter
to
fi(x) =
∏
t
(x− h(r‖A˜(niPt))) +Ki (4)
for all ui < ut, where h is an one-way hash function and r is a random number.
Lin-Hsu scheme is an effective secure method to overcome the security leak of
Jeng-Wang method. However, this method must be re-computed the secure-
filter fi for each i when an user is added into or deleted from the hierarchy[8].
Tripathy and Paul[11] also proposed another attacked method on Jeng-Wang
method in dynamic access control problem in 2011.
In this paper, we propose a novel secure-filter to overcome Lin-Hsu and
Tripathy-Paul attacks. In our method, the CA needs to choose two addition
random integers. One is a secure number ni and the other is a public number
hi. We choose the secure-filter as
fi(x) = (x− hi) ·
(∏
t
(x− A˜(niPt))
)
+ Lli(Kj) (5)
where Lli is the cyclic li-shift operator. Our proposed methods eliminate all
security flaws of secure filter in Jeng-Wang method that we know and is efficient
in dynamic access control.
In section 2, we introduce Wu et.al. and Jeng-Wang key management
schemes, the security leaks of Jeng-Wang method and Lin-Hsu improvement.
We propose our method in section 3 and discuss the dynamic access control
problem in section 4.
2. Preliminaries
Let S = {u1, u2, · · · , un} be a set with a partial ordering “≤”. ui ≤ uj
means that the user uj has a security clearance higher than or equal to ui. For
simplicity, ui < uj means that the user uj has a security clearance higher than
ui and uj is called a strictly predecessor of ui. Denote the set of all strictly
predecessors of ui by Si = {uj|ui < uj, uj ∈ S} .
Definition 1. [14] The secure-filter on K with respect to Σ = {si|si ∈ Zp, 0 ≤
i ≤ n− 1} is a polynomial f with the indeterminate x over a Galois field GF(p)
such that if s ∈ Σ, then f(s) ≡ K(mod p) where p is a public large prime.
In Jeng-Wang and Wu et.al.s’ methods, CA publishes these coefficients
an−1, an−2, · · · , a0 of the general form of f ,
f(x) = xn + an−1x
n−1 + · · ·+ a1x+ a0. (6)
.
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2.1. Two solutions of hierarchical access control problems
Now, let us introduce Wu et.al and Jeng et.al.s’ methods roughly.
Wu et. al.’s scheme[14] :
Key generation phase -
1. Choose distinct secret integers si ∈ Zp, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
2. For each ui ∈ S do step 3-5
3. Determine the set Σi = {g
sj
i |uj ∈ Sj}.
4. Set
fi(x) =


(x− gs0i )(x− g
s1
i ) · · · (x − g
sNi
i ) +Ki
=
∏
a∈Σi
(x− a) +Ki
if Si 6= φ
0 if Si = φ
.
(7)
5. Assign si, gi and all coefficients of the general form of fi to ui;
ui keeps si and Ki private, and makes (fi, gi) public.
Key derivation phase -
Consequently, the predecessor uj of ui can compute g
sj
i from his
secure number sj and the public number gi. Then the user uj obtain
the cryptographic key Ki by fi(g
sj
i ).
Jeng-Wang method[6] :
Initialization phase -
1. CA randomly choose a large prime p, and a, b ∈ Zp with 4a
3 +
27b2 mod p 6= 0. There is a group of elliptic curve Ep(a, b) over
a Galois field GF (p) that contains a set of points (x, y) with
x, y ∈ Z∗p satisfying y
2 = x3 + ax + b(mod p) and a point O at
infinity. Let G ∈ Ep(a, b) be a base point whose order is a large
prime q.
2. CA selects an algorithm A˜ : (x, y) → v for representing a point
(x, y) on Ep(a, b) as a real number v.
3. CA publishes (p, q, A˜, E,G).
Key generation phase -
1. CA determines its security key nca ∈ Zq and publishes the public
key Pca = ncaG.
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2. Each security class ui chooses its encryption key Ki, a secret key
ni ∈ Zq and a public key Pi = niG.
3. ui chooses a random integer k and encrypts (Ki, ni) as a cipher-
text {kG, (Ki, ni) + kPca}, and sends this ciphertext to CA.
4. CA decrypts {kG, (Ki, ni)+kPca} to obtain (Ki, ni) by the equa-
tion
(Ki, ni) = ((Ki, ni) + kPca)− nca(kG). (8)
5. CA generate the secure-filter
fi(x) =


(x− A˜(n1Pi)) · · · (x− A˜(nNiPi)) +Ki
=
∏
uj∈Si
(x− A˜(njPi)) +Ki
if Si 6= φ
0 if Si = φ
.
(9)
key derivation phase -
When uj is a predecessor of ui, uj can use the secure key nj , the pub-
lic key Pi and the public secure-filter fi to derive Ki = fi(A˜(njPi)).
2.2. Two attacks on Jeng-Wang method
Both of above solutions are secure in a static hierarchical system, it means
that no user is added into or deleted from S. However, these schemes are
insecure when a user joins or removes from the hierarchy. Two different attacks
on Jeng-Wang method have be presented. We discuss these attacks on the Jeng-
Wang method (and the Wu et. al.’s method) in this subsection. For simplicity,
we denote the secure-filter fi(x) of a security class ui as
fi(x) = (x− ci,1)(x− ci,2) · · · (x − ci,Ni) +Ki. (10)
The value ci,j plays the same role as g
sj
i in Wang et. al.’s scheme or A˜(njPi) in
Jeng-Wang method.
Lin-Hsu attack[8, 9] :
Without lose of the generality, we only consider the situation that there is
a new security class joining in hierarchy. Let ui be a security class (user)
in S, Si = {uj|ui < uj and uj ∈ S} be the set of strictly predecessors of
ui and uN be a new predecessor of ui. Assume that
fi(x) = (x− ci,1)(x − ci,2) · · · (x− ci,Nv ) +Ki
is the secure-filter of ui in the original hierarchy and
f˜i(x) = (x− ci,1)(x − ci,2) · · · (x− ci,Nv )(x− ci,N ) +Ki
is the new secure-filter in the new hierarchy after uN is inserted.
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One has
f˜i(x)− fi(x) = (x − ci,1)(x − ci,2) · · · (x− ci,Ni)(x − ci,N − 1). (11)
Obviously, ci,1 · · · ci,Ni are the solutions of f˜i(x)−fi(x) = 0. The adversary
can obtain ci,j for some j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , Ni} by solving the equation (f˜i −
fi)(x) = 0, and then get the encryption key Ki of ui by fi(ci,j) or f˜i(ci,j).
Tripathy-Paul attack[11] :
In 2011, Tripathy and Paul pointed out another attack on Jeng-Wang
method. With the assumptions in Lin-Hsu attack, the general form of the
secure-filters fi(x) and f˜i(x) are
fi(x) = x
Ni + αNi−1x
Ni−1 + · · ·+ α1x
1 + α0 (12)
and
f˜i(x) = x
Ni+1 + βNix
Ni + · · ·+ β1x
1 + β0, (13)
respectively. Since
αNi−1 = ci,1 + ci,2 + · · ·+ ci,Ni ,
βNi = ci,1 + ci,2 + · · ·+ ci,Ni + ci,N ,
(14)
and αj , βk for each j, k are public information, the adversary can obtain
ci,N by subtracting βNi from αNi−1, and the encryption keyKi = f˜i(ci,N ).
2.3. Lin-Hsu improvement
Lin and Hsu [8, 9] presented an improvement of Jeng-Wang scheme. They
used a random number r and an one-way hash function h(·) replacing (A˜(njPi),Ki)
in Jeng-Wang scheme with (h(r‖A˜(njPi)),Ki). That is, the value ci,j in Eq.(10)
for each j should be changed when a security class is added in or deleted from
in hierarchy. This implies that A˜(njPi) is not solution of f˜i(x)− fi(x) = 0 any-
more. Hence, this method eliminates the security flaw on Jeng-Wang method
effectively (see [8, 9] for the details).
3. Our proposed method
First, let us introduce some definitions and properties of the cyclic l-shift
operator.
Definition 2. Let b be a positive integer greater than 1. The radix (base) b
expansion of a positive integer k is a unique expansion of k as
k = km+1b
m + kmb
m−1 + · · ·+ k2b+ k1 (15)
where ki ∈ {0, 1, · · · , b− 1} for each i and km+1 6= 0. This expansion is written
as (km+1km · · · k1)b. The integer ki is called the i-th coefficient of the radix b
expansion of k, whereas km+1 is the leading coefficient of the radix b expansion
of k.
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Definition 3. Let b be a positive integer greater than 1 and l be an integer.
The cyclic l-shift operator Ll(·) based on b is defined by
Ll(k) = (km+1kσl(m)kσl(m−1) · · · kσl(1))b = km+1b
m +
m∑
i=1
kσl(i)b
i−1, (16)
where (km+1km · · · k1)b is the radix b expansion of n and σ = (1, 2, · · · ,m) is
the m-cyclic in the symmetric group Sm of degree m.
Example 1. If b = 10, then L1(21349) = 23491, L2(21349) = 24913, L3(21349) =
29134 and L4(21349) = 21349.
If b = 2, then L1((11110)2) = (11101)2, L2((11110)2) = (11011), L3((11110)2) =
(10111)2 and L4((11110)2) = (11110)2.
Proposition 1. Let b be a positive integer greater than 1 and p be a positive
integer greater than b with the radix b expansion (pm+1pm · · · p1)b. Suppose k
is a positive integer less than p and there exists m + 1 nonnegative integers
km+1, km, · · · , k1 less than b such that k =
∑m+1
i=1 kib
i−1. We still denote it by
(km+1km · · · k1)b and km+1 may be zero.
If km+1 < pm+1, one has
Ll(k) = (km+1kσl(m)kσl(m−1) · · · kσl(1))b < p. (17)
Furthermore, if k ∈ Z∗p, then
L−l(Ll(k)) = k (18)
in Z∗p.
Proof. Since
∑m
i=1 kσl(i)b
i−1 < bm and km+1 < pm+1, one has
Ll(k) = km+1b
m +
m∑
i=1
kσl(i)b
i−1 < km+1b
m + bm ≤ pm+1b
m ≤ p.
This implies that
Ll(k) ≡ (km+1kσl(m)kσl(m−1) · · · kσl(1))b (mod p).
Hence,
L−l(Ll(k)) = L−l((km+1kσl(m)kσl(m−1) · · · kσl(1))b) = (km+1km · · · k1)
in Z∗p.
Remark 1. In general, L−l(Ll(k)) may not be equal to k in Z
∗
p even if k < p.
For instance, if b = 10, p = 239, l = 1 and k = 235. Then
L−1(L1(235)) = L−1(253 mod 239) = L−1(014) = 41
in Z∗239.
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Now, we discuss our solution of the access control in hierarchy. In our
method, CA is a super security class which should choose a secrete integer hi
and a public integer li for each secure-filter fi. Let Ll(x) be a cyclic l-shift
operator. Then the secure-filter in our proposed method is given by
fi(x) = (x− hi)(x− ai,1) · · · (x− ai,Ni) + Lli(Ki) (19)
where ai,j plays the same role as A˜(njPi) in Jeng-Wang method.
Method 1: (Revised Jeng-Wang method)
Initialization phase -
1. CA randomly chooses a small positive integer d greater than 1, a
large prime p, and a, b ∈ Z∗p satisfying that 4a
3+27b2 mod p 6= 0
Let Ep(a, b) be an elliptic curve y
2 = x3+ ax+ b (mod p) over a
Galois field GF (p) containing a set of points (x, y) with x, y ∈ Z∗p
and a point O at infinity. CA selects a base point G of Ep(a, b)
whose order is a large prime q.
2. CA selects an algorithm A˜ : (x, y) → v, for representing a point
(x, y) on Ep(a, b) as a real number v.
3. CA publishes (d, p, q, A˜, E,G).
Key generation phase -
1. CA determines its security key nca ∈ Z
∗
q and publishes the public
key Pca = ncaG.
2. Each security class ui chooses a secret key ni ∈ Z
∗
q , a public
key Pi = niG and its encryption key Ki such that the leading
coefficient of the radix d expansion of Ki is less than the leading
coefficient of the radix d expansion of p and all coefficients of the
radix d expansion of Ki are not all equal.
3. ui chooses a random integer k and encrypts (Ki, ni) as a cipher-
text {kG, (Ki, ni) + kPca}, and sends this ciphertext to CA.
4. CA decrypts {kG, (Ki, ni)+kPca} to obtain (Ki, ni) by the equa-
tion
(Ki, ni) = ((Ki, ni) + kPca)− nca(kG). (20)
5. CA randomly choose a secret integer hi and a public integer li.
6. CA generates the secure-filter
fi(x) = (x− hi)(x− A˜(n1Pi)) · · · (x− A˜(nNiPi)) + Lli(Ki)
=
∏
uj∈Si
(x− A˜(njPi)) + Lli(Ki)
(21)
and publishes it.
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Figure 1: A hierarchy (S,≤).
key derivation phase -
When uj is a predecessor of ui, uj can use the secure key nj, the
public key Pi and the public secure-filter fi to derive Lli(Ki) =
fi(A˜(njPi)). Finally, uj obtain the cryptographic keyKi = L−li(Lli(Ki))
by Proposition 1.
Example 2. In Fig. 1, the user set has 5 security classes denoted as S =
{u1, · · · , u5}. The secure-filter of ui in our method forms as
fi(x) = (x − hi)
∏
ui<uj
(x− A˜(njPi)) + Lli(Ki). (22)
For simplicity, we denote A˜(njPi) as ai,j here and after. All secure-filters in
the hierarchy S are
u1 : f1(x) = 0
u2 : f2(x) = (x− h2)(x − a2,1) + Ll2(K2)
u3 : f3(x) = (x− h3)(x − a3,1) + Ll3(K3)
u4 : f4(x) = (x− h4)(x − a4,1)(x− a4,2) + Ll4(K4)
u5 : f5(x) = (x− h5)(x − a5,1)(x− a5,2)(x − a5,3) + Ll5(K5)
(23)
3.1. Security analysis
When a new predecessor uN of ui is added in hierarchy, the secure-filter of
ui,
fi(x) = (x− hi)(x− ai,1) · · · (x− ai,Ni) + Lli(Ki), (24)
becomes
f˜i(x) = (x− h˜i)(x− ai,1) · · · (x− ai,Ni) + Ll˜i(Ki). (25)
Because hi, h˜i, li and l˜i can randomly be chosen by CA, we may assume
hi 6= h˜i and Lli(Ki) 6= Ll˜i(Ki). Therefore, ai,1 · · · ai,Ni are not the solutions
of f˜i(x) − fi(x) = 0 and Lin-Hsu attack fails. By comparing the coefficients of
xNi , xNi−1 of fi(x) and the coefficients of xNi+1, xNi of f˜i(x), one has{
αNi = ai,1 + ai,2 + · · ·+ ai,Ni + hi
βNi+1 = ai,1 + ai,2 + · · ·+ ai,Ni + ai,N + h˜i
(26)
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and 

αNi−1 =
∏
s6=t ai,sai,t + hi(
∑
s ai,s)
βNi =
∏
s6=t ai,sai,t + (ai,N + h˜i)(
∑
s ai,s) + ai,N h˜i
(27)
where 1 ≤ s, t ≤ Ni.
Eq.(26) and Eq.(27) imply{
βNi+1 − αNi = ai,N + h˜i − hi
βNi − αNi−1 = (ai,N + h˜i − hi)(
∑
ai,s) + ai,N h˜i.
(28)
Consequently,
βNi − αNi−1 = (βNi+1 − αNi)(αNi − hi) + ai,N h˜i, (29)
that is,
ai,N h˜i − (βNi+1 − αNi)hi = (βNi − αNi−1)− (βNi+1 − αNi)αNi . (30)
Eq.(30) is a nonlinear equation with indeterminates ai,N , hi and h˜i and it is
hard to solve in Z∗p.
3.2. Dynamic key management
An efficient method for updating the secure-filter is the main task in dynamic
access control of our proposed methods. Before discussing the problems of
dynamic key management, we introduce some properties for our secure-filters.
Theorem 1. Let
f(x) = (x− a1)(x− a2) · · · (x− an) +K1 (31)
and
g(x) = (x − a1)(x− a2) · · · (x− an)(x − an+1) +K2 (32)
be two polynomials in Z∗p. Immediately, we have f(x) =
g(x)−K2
(x−an+1)
+ K1 or
g(x) = (x− an+1)(f(x) −K1) +K2.
If f(x) =
∑n
i=0 αix
i and g(x) =
∑n−1
i=0 βix
i, then we have
βj =


1 if j = n+ 1
αj−1 − an+1αj if j ∈ {2, 3, · · · , n}
α0 − an+1α1 −K1 if j = 1
(K2 −K1)− an+1α0 if j = 0
(33)
or
αj =


1 if j = n
βj+1 + an+1αj+1 if j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n− 1}
β1 + an+1α1 +K1 if j = 0
(34)
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Proof. One has
g(x) = (x− an+1)
∏n
i=0(x− ai) +K2
= (x− an+1)(f(x) −K1) +K2
= (x− an+1)(αnx
n + αn−1x
n−1 · · ·+ α0 −K1) +K2
= αnx
n+1 + (αn−1 − an+1αn)x
n + · · ·+ (α1 − an+1α2)x
2
+(α0 −K1 − an+1α1)x+K2 − an+1(α0 −K1).
(35)
Comparing the coefficients of each terms of f(x) and g(x), we obtain Eq.(33)
and (34).
Corollary 1. Let f(x) = (x− h1)(x− a1) · · · (x− an) +K1 be a polynomial of
degree n + 1 in Z∗p and αi be the coefficient of the term x
i of the general form
of f(x). Hence, f(x) =
∑n+1
i=0 αix
i.
If g(x) = (x − h2)(x − a1) · · · (x − an)(x − an+1) + K2 is a polynomial of
degree n+ 2 in Z∗p then the coefficient βj of x
j of g(x) can be computed by the
formulas in Theorem 1.
Proof. Since
g(x) = (x − an+1)
{
(x− h2)
[
f(x)−K1
(x− h1)
+ 0
]
+ 0
}
+K2.
Hence, the coefficients of G1(x) =
f(x)−K1
(x−h1)
+0 can be estimated by Eq.(34), and
the coefficients of G2(x) = (x−h2)(G1(x)−0)+0) can be estimated by Eq.(33).
Finally, we obtain the coefficients of g(x) = (x− an+1)(G2(x)− 0) +K2 by the
Eq.(33).
Corollary 2. Under the same assumptions in Corollary 1. If h(x) = (x −
h3)(x− a1) · · · (x− an−1) +K3 is a polynomial of degree n, then the coefficient
of xj of h(x) can be obtained by Theorem 1.
Proof. Since
h(x) = (x− h3)
{
1
(x− h1)
[
f(x)−K1
(x− an)
+ 0
]
+ 0
}
+K3,
the coefficients ofH1(x) =
f(x)−K1
x−an
can be evaluated by Eq. (34), the coefficients
ofH2(x) =
H1(x)−0
(x−h1)
can be computed by Eq. (34). And we obtain the coefficients
of h(x) = (x− h3)(H2(x)− 0) +K3 by Eq. (33).
Inserting new security class:
Assume that a new security class ur is inserted into the hierarchy such
that ui < ur < uj .
1. Determine the secret information ur,Kr, nr, hr, the public informa-
tion Pr, lr and the public secure-filter fr(x) by the steps 2-6 in key
generation phase of our proposed method.
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Figure 2: A new security class u6 is inserted into the hierarchy (S,≤).
2. For each us < ur (i.e. the strictly successor of ur)
(a) Update the secret number hs and the public number ls.
(b) Update the secure-filter fs(x) of us by Corollary 1.
Removing existing security classes :
Assume that an existing member ur is removed from a hierarchy (S,≤)
and Sr = {us|ur ≤ us} is the set of all strictly predecessors of ur.
1. For each strictly predecessor us of ur,
(a) CA chooses a new secret number hs and a new public number ls
randomly.
(b) Update the secret filter fs by Corollary 2.
2. Delete the security class ur from the hierarchy (S,≤) and discard the
secret and public information of ur.
Example 3. In Fig. 2, a new security class u6 is inserted into the hierarchy S
in Fig. 1 such that u4 < u6 < u1. The secure-filter of u6 is
f6(x) = (x− h6)(x− a6,1) + Ll6(K6). (36)
Since u4 is the only strictly successor of u6, CA only needs to update the secure-
filter of u4. Assume that CA chooses a new secrete number h˜4 and a public
number l˜4 randomly. After u6 is inserted, the secure-filter of u4becomes
f4(x) = (x− h˜4)(x− a4,1)(x− a4,2)(x − a4,6) + Ll˜4(K4). (37)
Now, let us compute the coefficients of this new secure-filter in Eq.(37) from the
original secure-filter,(x − h4)(x − a4,1)(x − a4,2) + Ll4(K4), by Eqs. (33) and
(34). Assume that
(x− h4)(x− a4,2)(x − a4,1) + Ll4(K4) =
3∑
i=0
α1i x
i, (38)
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1. Using Eq. (34), the coefficients of the indeterminate x of
(x− a4,1)(x− a4,2) + 0 =
2∑
i=0
α2i x
i (39)
can be obtained by
α22 = 1
α21 = −(a4,1 + a4,2) = α
1
2 + h4α
2
2
α20 = a4,1a4,2 = α
1
1 + 0− h4α
2
1
(40)
2. Using Eg. (33), CA computes the coefficients of
(x− h˜4)(x − a4,1)(x− a4,2) + 0 =
3∑
i=0
α3ix
i; (41)
α33 = 1
α32 = −(a4,1 + a4,2)− h˜4 = α
2
1 − h˜4α
2
2
α31 = a4,1a4,2 + h˜4(a4,1 + a4,2) = α
2
0 − h˜4α
2
1
α30 = −h˜4a4,1a4,2 = −h˜4α
2
0 + 0.
(42)
3. Using Eq. (33) again, the coefficients of
(x − h˜4)(x− a4,1)(x − a4,2)(x− a4,6) + Ll˜4(K4) =
4∑
i=0
α4ix
i (43)
are
α44 = 1
α43 = −(a4,1 + a4,2 + h˜4)− a4,6 = α
3
2 − a4,6α
3
3
α42 = (a4,1a4,2 + h˜4a4,1 + h˜4a4,2)− a4,6(−h˜4 − a4,1 − a4,2) = α
3
1 − a4,6α
3
2
α41 = −h˜4a4,1a4,2 − a4,6(a4,1a4,2) + h˜4a4,1 + h˜4a4,2) = α
3
0 − a4,6α
3
1
α40 = a4,1a4,2a4,6h˜4 + Ll˜4(K4) = a4,6α
3
0 + Ll˜4(L−l4(Ll4(K4))).
(44)
4. Finally, CA updates the secure-filter of u4 as the coefficients {α
4
0, α
4
1, · · · , α
4
4}.
Example 4. In Fig. 3, let u3 be removed from the hierarchy (S,≤) so that the
relationship u5 < u3 < u1 breaks up. CA removes all information related to u3
and choose four random numbers h˜4, l˜4, h˜5 and l˜5. CA replaces the secure-filter
of u5 by
f5(x) = (x− h˜5)(x − a5,1)(x− a5,2) + Ll˜5(K5). (45)
Assume that (x− h5)(x − a5,1)(x− a5,2)(x − a5,3) + Ll5(K5) =
∑4
i=0 β
1
i x
i.
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
Figure 3: An existing member u2 is removed from the hierarchy (S,≤).
1. The coefficients of (x− a5,1)(x − a5,2)(x − a5,3) + 0 =
∑3
i=0 β
2
i x
i are
β23 = 1
β22 = β
1
3 + h5β
2
3
β21 = β
1
2 + h5β
2
2
β20 = β
1
1 − h5(β
2
1) + 0
(46)
2. The coefficients of (x− a5,1)(x − a5,2) + 0 =
∑2
i=0 β
3
i x
i are
β32 = 1
β31 = β
2
2 + a5,3β
3
2
β30 = β
2
1 + a5,3β
3
1 .
(47)
3. The coefficients of (x− h˜5)(x − a5,1)(x− a5,2) + Ll˜5(K5) are
β43 = 1
β42 = β
3
1 − h5β
3
2
β41 = β
3
0 − 0− h5β
3
1
β40 = −h5(β
3
0 − 0) + Ll˜5(L−l5(Ll5(K5))).
(48)
4. Then, CA publishes these coefficients β40 , · · ·β
4
3 .
4. Conclusion
Our proposed method in this paper is a secure solution of access control
in hierarchy and the scheme of dynamic key management is very simple and
efficient. Furthermore, Wu et.al.’s method becomes a secure method under our
secure-filter.
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Method 2: (Revised Wu et. al. method)
Key generation phase -
1. Choose distinct secret integer si ∈ Zp, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
2. CA chooses a small integer d greater than 1 and publishes d.
3. For each ui ∈ S do step 3-5
4. Determine the set Σi = {g
sj
i |uj ∈ Sj}.
5. CA randomly choose a secret integer hi and a public integer li.
6. Determine the encryption keyKi such that the leading coefficient
of the radix d expansion of Ki is less than the leading coefficient
of the radix d expansion of p and all coefficients of the radix d
expansion of Ki are not all equal.
7. Set
fi(x) = (x− hi)(x− g
s0
i )(x− g
s1
i ) · · · (x − g
sNi
i ) + Lli(Ki)
= (x− hi) ·
∏
a∈Σi
(x− a) + Lli(Ki)
(49)
8. ui keeps si and Ki private, and makes (fi, gi, li) public.
Key derivation phase - Consequently, the predecessor uj of ui can
compute g
sj
i from his secure number sj and the public number gi.
Then the user uj obtain Lli(Ki) by fi(g
sj
i ) as well as the crypto-
graphic keyKi by a cyclic−li-shift operatorL−li,Ki = L−li(Lli(Ki)).
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